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One major aim of research in affective nat-
ural language generation is to be able to
use language intelligently to induce effects
on the emotions of the reader/ hearer. Al-
though varying the content of generated
language (“strategic” choices) might be
expected to change the effect on emotions,
it is not obvious that varying the form of
the language (“tactical” choices) can do
this. Indeed, previous experiments have
been unable to show emotional effects of
tactical variations. Building on what has
been discovered in previous experiments,
we present a new experiment which does
demonstrate such effects. This represents
an important step towards the empirical
evaluation of affective NLG systems.
1 Introduction
This paper is about developing techniques for the
empirical evaluation of affective natural language
generation (NLG). Affective NLG has been de-
fined as “NLG that relates to, arises from or de-
liberately influences emotions or other non-strictly
rational aspects of the Hearer” (De Rosis and
Grasso, 2000). It currently covers two main
strands of work, the portrayal of non-rational as-
pects in an artificial speaker/writer (e.g. the work
of Mairesse and Walker (2008) on projecting per-
sonality) and the use of NLG in ways sensitive to
the non-rational aspects of the hearer/reader and
calculated to achieve effects on these aspects (e.g.
the work of De Rosis et al. (1999) on generat-
ing instructions in an emotionally charged situa-
tion and that of Moore et al. (2004) on producing
appropriate tutorial feedback). Although there has
been success in evaluating work of the first kind,
it remains more problematic to evaluate whether
work of the second type directly affects emotion or
mood, or whether it influences task performance
for other reasons.
Since the work of Thompson (1977), NLG tasks
have been considered to divide mainly into those
involving strategy (“deciding what to say”) and
tactics (“deciding how to say it”). It seems clear
that one can affect a reader’s emotion differently
by making different strategic decisions about con-
tent (e.g. telling someone that they have passed
an exam will make them happier than telling them
that they have failed), but it is less clear that tac-
tical alternations (e.g. involving ordering of ma-
terial, choice of words or syntactic constructions)
can have these kinds of effects. Unfortunately,
the exact dividing line between strategy and tac-
tics remains a matter of debate. For the purpose
of this paper, we take “strategic” to cover matters
of basic propositional content (the basic informa-
tion to be communicated) and “tactical” to include
most linguistic issues, including matters of em-
phasis and focus, inasmuch as they can be influ-
enced by linguistic formulation. It is important to
know whether tactical choices can influence emo-
tions because to a large extent NLG research con-
centrates on tactical issues (partly because strate-
gic NLG remains a rather domain-specific activ-
ity).
Some light on the effects of tactical variations
in text is shed by work in Psychology, where there
has been a great deal of work on the effects of the
“framing” of a text (Moxey and Sanford, 2000;
Teigen and Brun, 2003). Some of this has been
industrially funded, as there are considerable ap-
plications, for instance, in advertising. The alter-
native texts considered differ in ways that NLG re-
searchers would call tactical. For instance, a piece
of meat could be described as “75% lean” or “25%
fat”, and arguably these are alternative truthful de-
scriptions of the same situation. However, evalu-
ation of this work has been primarily in terms of
whether it affects people’s choices or evaluations
of options available (Levin et al., 1998), or other
aspects of task performance (O’Hara and Stern-
berg, 2001; Brown and Pinel, 2003; Cadinu et al.,
2005). As far as we know it is unknown whether
emotions can be affected in this way. There is
therefore an open question about whether it is pos-
sible to detect the non-rational effects of differ-
ent tactical decisions on readers. We believe that
achieving this is important for the further scientific
development of affective NLG.
In the rest of this paper, we discuss previous
(unsuccessful) attempts to measure emotional ef-
fects of tactical decisions in texts (section 2), the
particular linguistic choices we have focussed on,
including a text validation experiment (section 3)
and our choice of a method for measuring emo-
tions (section 4). In section 5 we then present a
new study which for the first time demonstrates
significant differences in emotions evoked in read-
ers associated with tactical textual variations. We
then briefly reflect on this result in a concluding
section.
2 Background for the Present Study
In (van der Sluis and Mellish, 2008) we de-
scribed several experiments investigating differ-
ent methods of measuring the effects of texts on
emotions to demonstrate that tactical differences
would lead to differences in effects. Our method
was to present participants with texts about cancer-
causing chemicals in foods or unexpected health-
giving properties of drinking water and to attempt
to measure the emotions invoked by different vari-
ations of these texts. However, we were unable
to show statistically significant results of tactical
variations. We mentioned the following possible
explanations for this:
• We used methods where participants reported on their
own emotions. However, it could be that (in this con-
text) participants were unwilling or unable to report ac-
curately.
• The self-reporting methods used were perhaps not fine
grained enough to register the differences between the
effects of similar texts.
• The texts themselves were perhaps too subtly different
or not long enough to induce strong emotions.
• The participants were perhaps not involved enough in
the task to get strong emotions.
We believe that of these, the final reason is the
most compelling. The self-reporting methods used
had been validated and used in multiple previous
studies in Psychology, and so there was no rea-
son to suggest that they would fundamentally fail
in this new context. The granularity of the mea-
surement methods can be improved relatively sim-
ply (see section 4 below). But it is very believ-
able that the participants would fail to be really
concerned by the texts in the experiments reported
since the source was unclear, the message a gen-
eral one not addressed to them individually and the
topic (healthy and unhealthy food) one that occurs
often enough in newspapers to fail to overcome
natural boredom.
The main innovation of the experiment we de-
scribe below was in our method of seeking the
emotional involvement of the participants. The
texts that the participants read took the form of
“feedback” on a (fake) IQ test that they undertook
as part of the experiment. We selected university
students as the participants, as they would likely
be concerned about their intelligence, especially
as compared to their peers. The texts appeared to
be written individually for the participants and so
sought to engage them directly.
3 Linguistic Choice and Framing
As in (van der Sluis and Mellish, 2008), the study
we present here sought to evoke positive emotions
to differing extents in a reader by tactical manip-
ulations to “slant” the tasks positively to varying
degrees. This section describes the text variations
used and their validation.
3.1 Tactical Methods
The two texts produced for this experiment were
written by hand, but used the following methods
to give a more “positive slant” to a text. These are
all methods that could be implemented straight-
forwardly in an NLG system1. In the follow-
ing, the word “positive polarity” is used to refer
to propositions giving good news to the reader or
attributes which give good news to the reader if
they have high values (such as the reader’s intel-
ligence). Similarly “negative polarity” refers to
items that represent bad news, e.g. failing a test.
For ethical reasons, negative polarity items did not
arise in this experiment.
A. Sentence emphasis - include explicit emphasis in sen-
tences expressing positive polarity propositions (e.g.
exclamation marks and phrases such as “on top of
this”).
1Though the choice about when to apply them might not
be so straightforward.
B. Choice of vague evaluative adjectives - when evaluat-
ing positive polarity attributes, choose vague evaluative
adjectives that are more positive over ones that are less
positive (e.g. “excellent”, rather than “ok”).
C. Choice of vague adverbs - provide explicit emphasis to
positive polarity propositions by including vague ad-
verbs expressing great extent (e.g. “significantly”,
rather than “to some extent” or no adverb).
D. Choice of verbs - for a positive polarity proposition,
choose a verb that emphasises the great extent of the
proposition (e.g. “outperformed”, rather than “did bet-
ter than”).
E. Choice of realisation of rhetorical relations - when re-
alising a concession/contrast relation between a pos-
itive polarity proposition and one that is negative or
neutral, word it so that the positive polarity proposi-
tion is in the nucleus (more emphasised) position (e.g.
say “although you did badly on X, you did well on Y”
instead of “although you did well on Y, you did badly
on X”).
The idea is that an NLG system would employ
methods of this kind in order to “slant” a mes-
sage positively, rather that to present a message
in a more neutral way. This might be done, for
instance, to induce positive emotions in a reader
who needs encouragement.
We claim that these choices can be viewed as
tactical, i.e. that they are “allowable” alterna-
tive realisations of the same underlying content.
For instance, we believe a teacher could use such
methods in giving feedback to a student need-
ing encouragement without fear of prosecution for
misrepresenting the same truth that would be ex-
pressed without the use of these methods.
Whenever one words a proposition in differ-
ent ways, it can be claimed that a (perhaps sub-
tle) change of meaning is involved. However, in
these cases we claim that it is the writer’s atti-
tudes that are being manipulated (and reflected in
the text). We can therefore choose between these
alternatives by varying the writer, not the under-
lying message. Our view is supported by a num-
ber of current accounts of the semantics of vague
adjectives (though this is not an area without con-
troversy). Many accounts of vagueness appeal to
the idea that there is a norm which an adjective
like “tall” implicitly refers to, and some of these
argue both that the norm itself can be contextually
determined and also that the amount by which the
norm has to be exceeded has to be “significant”
to a degree which is “relativized to some agent”
(Kennedy, 2007). For instance, with the phrase
“John is tall”
“the property [...] attributed to John is not
an intrinsic property, but rather a relational one.
Moreover, it is not a property the possession of
which depends only on the difference between
Johns height and some norm, but also on whether
that difference is a significant one. I take it that
whether or not a difference is a significant differ-
ence does not depend only on its magnitude, but
also on what our interests are” (Graff, 2000)
It is compatible with these accounts that differ-
ent agents, with different interests and notions of
what is noteworthy, can use vague adjectives in
different ways2.
Another reason for considering these meth-
ods as tactical is that in an NLG system, they
would likely be implemented somewhere late in
the “pipeline”.
Probably the best way to check that we are using
tactical alternations (according to our definition) is
via some kind of text validation experiment with
human participants. Section 3.3 below describes
such an experiment, which provides strong sup-
port for this position.
3.2 Test Texts
For the experiment, we produced two feedback
texts describing the same set of intelligence test
results, one relatively neutral and one “positively
slanted” using the above methods. In the ex-
periment, they were given to participants in two
groups, named “0” and “+” respectively. Each text
consisted of 7 sentences, with a direct correspon-
dance between the sentences of the two texts. Fig-
ure 1 presents the variations used in the feedback
used in the experiment for group + (i.e. positively
slanted) and group 0 (i.e. neutrally slanted). Note
that the actual numbers are the same in both texts.
3.3 Text validation
A text validation study was conducted in which
15 colleagues participated. The participants were
asked to comment on 12 sentence pairs, the 7
shown in Figure 1 and 5 additional filler pairs. The
following analysis reports on our findings on the 7
sentence pairs shown in Figure 1 only.
In order that we could test our intuitions about
the tactical nature of the linguistic alternations
(discussed in section 3.1 above), the participants
were presented with a scenario where there were
two different teachers, Mary Jones and Gordon
2Though there are certainly some limits on the situations
where a word like “tall” can be truthfully used to describe a
height
+1: Your Baumgartner score of 7.38 is excellent!
01: Your Baumgartner score of 7.38 is ok.
+2: You did distinctively better than the average score ob-
tained by other people in your age group.
02: You did somewhat better than the average score ob-
tained by other people in your age group.
+3: Especially your scores on Imagination/Creativity and
on Clarity of Thought were great and considerably
higher than average.
03: Your scores on Imagination/Creativity and on Clarity
of Thought were good and a little higher than average.
+4: A factor analyses of your Baumgartner score results in
an overall excellent performance.
04: A factor analyses of your Baumgartner score results in
an overall reasonable performance.
+5: Although, compared to your peers, you have only
slightly higher Spatial Intelligence (7.5 vs 7.0) and Vi-
sual Intelligence (7.2 vs 6.8) scores, your Clarity of
Thought Score is very much better (7.2 vs 6.3).
05: Compared to your peers, you have a somewhat better
Clarity of Thought Score (7.2 vs 6.3), but you have only
slightly higher Spatial Intelligence (7.5 vs 7.0) and Vi-
sual Intelligence (7.2 vs 6.8) scores.
+6: On top of this you also outperformed most people
in your age group with your exceptional scores for
Imagination and Creativity (7.9 vs 7.2) and Logical-
Mathematical Intelligence (7.1 vs. 6.5).
06: You did better than most people in your age group with
your scores for Imagination and Creativity (7.9 vs 7.2)
and Logical-Mathematical Intelligence (7.1 vs. 6.5).
+7: There is a lot of variation in your age group, but your
score is significantly higher than average.
07: Your score is higher than average, but there is a lot of
variation in your age group.
Figure 1: Linguistic variation used in the IQ test feedback
Smith, both completely honest but with very dif-
ferent ideas about teaching (Mary believing that
any pupil can succeed, given encouragement,
but Gordon believing that most pupils are lazy
and have overinflated ideas about their abilities).
Given a positively slanted sentence (e.g. +7) from
Mary and a corresponding more neutrally slanted
one (e.g. 07) from Gordon, addressed to one or
more pupils, participants were asked to indicate:
1. “Is it possible that Mary and Gordon might actually be
(honestly) giving different feedback to the same pupil
on the same task?”
2. “If the two pieces of feedback were given to the same
pupil (for the same task) and the pupil’s parents found
out, do you think they would have grounds to make a
complaint that one of the teachers is lying?”
The hypothesis was that (for the 7 pairs of
sentences from Figure 1) in general participants
would answer “yes” to question 1 and “no” to
question 2. Indeed, for 6 pairs at least 14 out of the
15 participants answered as we had predicted. For
the other pair (+4/04), 12 out of 15 agreed with
both predictions. We see this as very strong evi-
dence for our position (the participants gave dif-
ferent answers for the filler pairs, and so were not
just producing these answers blindly).
No alterations were made to the two feedback
texts on the basis of the text validation results.
4 Measuring Emotions
There are two broad ways of measuring the emo-
tions of human subjects – physiological methods
and self-reporting. Physiological methods unfor-
tunately tend to have the problems of complex
setup and calibration, which mean that it is hard to
transport them between tasks or individuals. In ad-
dition, although emotional states are undoubtedly
connected to physiological variables, it is not al-
ways clear what is being measured by these meth-
ods (cf. (Lazarus et al., 1980); (Cacioppo et al.,
2000) ).
Because of these problems, we have opted to in-
vestigate self-reporting methods, as validated and
used widely in psychological experiments. Three
well-established methods that are used frequently
in the field of psychology are the Russel Affect
Grid (Russell et al., 1989), the Self Assessment
Manikin (SAM) (Lang, 1980) and the Positive and
Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (Watson et al.,
1988). In our previous study (van der Sluis and
Mellish, 2008), we had problems with participants
understanding how to use the Russel Affect Grid
and SAM and so now we opted to use a version of
the PANAS test.
The PANAS test is a scale using affect terms
that describe positive and negative feelings and
emotions. Participants in the experiment read the
terms and indicate to what extent they experi-
ence(d) the emotions indicated by each of them
using a five point scale ranging from (1) very
slightly/not at all, (2) a little, (3) moderately, (4)
quite a bit to (5) extremely. A total score for
positive affect is calculated by simply adding the
scores for the positive terms, and similarly for neg-
ative affect.
As before, we used a simplified version of the
PANAS scale in order not to overburden the partic-
ipants with questions and to avoid bored answer-
ing. In this test, which has been fully validated
(Mackinnon et al., 1999), participants have to rate
only 10 instead of 20 terms: 5 for positive af-
fect (i.e. alert, determined, enthusiastic, excited,
inspired) and 5 for negative affect (i.e. afraid,
scared, nervous, upset, distressed).
Our use of the simplified PANAS in this study
differed from our previous study, however, by hav-
ing participants respond to the PANAS questions
using a slider, rather than a five point scale. This
means that only two terms were put at the extreme
ends of the slider (i.e. ‘very slightly/not at all’ and
‘extremely’ were presented but not ‘a little’, ‘mod-
erately’ or ‘quite a bit’). The change to use a slider
was because van der Sluis and Mellish (2008) ob-
served partipants only using a small part of the
possible scale for answers, and within this the five
point scale might have lost useful information.
Although our particular experiment focussed on
positive affect, we included the negative affect
terms partly so that we could detect outliers in
our participant set – people who were perhaps ex-
tremely nervous about the test or sensitive about
their IQ. In fact, we did not find any such outliers.
5 Experiment to Measure Emotional
Effects of Positive Feedback
5.1 Set Up of the Study
As stated above, the texts that we presented to
our participants were portrayed as giving feedback
on an IQ test that the participants had just taken.
The IQ test was set up as a web experiment in
which participants could linearly traverse through
the various phases of the test. An outline of the
set up is given in Figure 2. In the general intro-
duction to the experiment, participants were told
that the experiment was ‘an assessment of a new
kind of intelligence test which combines a number
of well-established methods that are used as indi-
cators of human brain power’. To make it more
difficult for the participant to keep track of how
well/poorly she performed over the course of the
test, it also said that the test consisted of open and
multiple choice questions that had different weight
factors in the calculation of the overall score and
that would assess various aspects of their intelli-
gence. Subsequently, the participant was asked
to tick a consent form to participate in the study.
Then a questionnaire followed in which the par-
ticipant was asked about her age, gender and the
quality of her English. She was also asked if she
had any experience with IQ tests and how she ex-
pected to score on this one. These questions were
interleaved with an emotion assessment test (re-
duced PANAS) in which the participant was asked
‘how do you feel right now?’.
After filling out the questionnaire, the partici-
pant could start the “IQ test” whenever she was
ready. The “IQ test” consisted of 30 questions
which she had to answer one at a time. The par-
ticipant could not skip a question and also had
to indicate for each of the questions how confi-
dent she was about her answer. The questions
that were used for the test were carefully collected
from the internet and included items from various
tests and games. Different types of questions were
used: questions about logical truths, mathematical
questions that required some calculations, ques-
tions about words and letter sequences, questions
including pictures and questions about the partic-
ipant’s personality. They were ordered randomly
(but with the same order for each participant).
When the participant had finished the test, she
was asked to wait patiently while the system cal-
culated the test scores. When enough calculation
time had passed the participant was presented with
the test feedback (one of the two texts, regardless
of their actual performance). This feedback first
explained the test and its type of scoring:
The Baumgartner test which you have just un-
dertaken tests various kinds of intelligence, for
instance, your visual intelligence, your logical-
mathematical intelligence and your spatial in-
telligence. These various aspects of your in-
telligence contribute to an overall Baumgartner
Score. The Baumgartner Score rates your intel-
ligence on a 10-point scale with 10 as the high-
est possible score. Note that your Baumgartner
Score can change over time dependent on expe-
rience and practice. Below your test score is pre-
sented in comparison with the average score in
your age group.
The introduction to the test was followed by ei-
ther the positively (+1..+7, Figure 1) or the rela-
tively neutrally (01..07, Figure 1) phrased test re-
sults. After the participant had processed the feed-
back, she was asked to fill out one more question-
naire to assess her emotions (i.e. ‘How do you
feel right now knowing your scores on the test’).
This time the simplified PANAS test was inter-
leaved with questions about the participant’s re-
sults, (e.g. were they as expected and how did she
value them), the test (e.g. was it difficult, doable
or easy?) and space for comments on the test and
the experiment. Finally the participant was de-
briefed about the experiment and about the goal
of the study.
1. General introduction to the experiment;
2. Consent form;
3. Questionnaire on participant’s background and famil-
iarity with IQ-test interleaved with a PANAS test to as-
sess the participant’s current emotional state;
4. Message: ‘Please press the next button at the bottom
of this page whenever you are ready to start the intelli-
gence test’;
5. IQ test questions;
6. Message: Please be patient while your answers are be-
ing processed and your test score is computed. After
the result page, you will be asked another set of ques-
tions about the test, your performance and the way you
feel about it. This information is very important for
this study, so please answer the questions as honestly
as possible.’;
7. Feedback + or 0;
8. Questionnaire: PANAS test to assess how the partic-
ipants felt after reading the test feedback interleaved
with questions about the test, their expectations and
space for comments;
9. Debriefing which informed participants about the
study’s purpose and stated that the IQ test was not real
and that their test results did not contain any truth.
Figure 2: Phases in the experiment set up
5.2 Pilot Experiment
A pilot of the experiment was carried out by ask-
ing a number of people to try the experiment via
the web interface. The main outcomes of this
study, in which 11 colleagues participated, was
that the experiment was too long. Accordingly, the
questionnaires before and after the IQ test (phase
3 and 8 in Figure 2) were shortened. Also the IQ
test itself was shortened from 40 to 30 questions.
5.3 Main Experiment: participants and
experimental setting
30 participants, all female university students,
took the IQ test. All participants except two were
in age band 18-24. The exceptions were in age
band 25-29 (group +) and 30-34 (group 0). The
participants were randomly distributed over group
+ and group 0 and (for ethical reasons) did the test
one by one in a one-person experiment room while
the experimenter was waiting outside the room.
As soon as the participant indicated that she had
finished the task (i.e. stepped out of the exper-
iment room), she was debriefed about the study
by the experimenter and was paid with a voucher
worth 5 pounds.
5.4 Hypotheses
Since the message of the feedback texts was rel-
atively positive and there is no necessary correla-
0-group +-group
Negative PANAS terms Before 1.60(.76) 1.58(.68)
Negative PANAS terms After 1.57(.68) 1.31(.45)
Positive PANAS terms Before 3.25(.78) 3.32(.55)
Positive PANAS terms After 3.13(.58) 3.75(.55)
Table 1: Means and Standard deviations (between brack-
ets) for the negative and positive PANAS terms as indicated
before and after the IQ test undertaken by participants that
received neutral and participants that received positive feed-
back on their performance.
tion between positive and negative PANAS scores
(Watson and Clark, 1999), we expected the main
effects of the texts to be on the average evaluation
of the positive PANAS terms. In order to cater for
the fact that individuals might differ in their initial
positive PANAS scores, we decided to look at the
difference of the scores (score after minus score
before). Therefore the hypothesis for this study
was that participants who received the positively
phrased feedback would show a larger change in
their positive emotions than the participants who
received the neutrally phrased feedback.
5.5 Results
Table 1 indicates that on average after they had re-
ceived their test results, participants in the +-group
were more positively tuned than participants in the
0-group. Participants in the +-group also rated the
positive emotion terms higher than they had done
before they undertook the IQ test. No such results
were found for the 0-group. In contrast, compared
to their responses before the IQ test, participants in
the 0-group rated the positive terms slightly lower
after they had processed their neutrally phrased
feedback. With respect to the negative PANAS
terms, participants in the +-group report slightly
less negative emotions after they read their test
scores, but none of the differences found in the
negative PANAS scores were significant.
A 2 (feedback type) * 2 (before/after) * 2 (pos-
itive/negative mean) repeated measures ANOVA
was carried out on the average PANAS scores.
This showed no main effect of feedback type
(+ vs 0) and no main effect of before/after on
average PANAS scores. However, there was a
highly significant interaction between feedback
type and before/after, which indicates that the
change in PANAS mean before and after the text
was strongly dependent on feedback type3 (F(1,
28) = 10.246, p < .003). We interpret this to mean
that the (after minus before) value is significantly
3An ANOVA test on the positive means only produces a
similar result.
0-group +-group
Alert Before 3.96(.80) 3.17(.99)
Alert After 3.45(.76) 3.65(.75)
Determined Before 3.49(1.02) 3.60(.50)
Determined After 3.50(1.13) 3.74(.61)
Enthusiastic Before 3.52(1.05 3.49(.72)
Enthusiastic After 2.97(.81) 3.84(.66)
Excited Before 2.74(.97) 3.28(.61)
Excited After 2.64(.75) 3.69(.83)
Inspired Before 2.56(1.21) 3.06(.77)
Inspired After 3.06(1.05) 3.81(.78)
Table 2: Means and Standard deviations (between brack-
ets) for the positive PANAS terms as indicated after the IQ
test undertaken by participants that received positive and par-
ticipants that received neutral feedback on their performance.
0-group +-group
ER
not disclosed 1 0
not so good 0 1
ok 9 4
well 4 10
extremely well 1 0
Table 3: Participant responses when questioned about the
results they expected (ER) .
greater for the +-group. A two-tailed, two sam-
ple t-test verifies this (t = 3.2, p < 0.004). We did
some post-hoc investigation in an attempt to un-
derstand the main result more fully. When look-
ing at the positive PANAS scores in more detail
(see Table 2), it turns out that only three of the
five positive PANAS terms included in the simpli-
fied PANAS test render promising results. Inter-
actions were found for the terms ‘alert’ (F(1, 28)
= 10.291, p < .003) and ‘enthusiastic’ (F(1, 28)
= 5.651, p < .025). No interactions were found
for the terms ‘determined’ and ‘inspired’. For ‘in-
spired’ however, we found a main effect of feed-
back type : (F(1, 28) = 8.755, p< .006), which in-
dicates that participants in the +-group could have
been more inspired because of their test scores
than participants in the 0-group. Not all of these
results would be significant if Bonferroni correc-
tions were made.
5.6 The Role of Expectations
It is possible that this result could have been
caused by other (systematic but unanticipated) dif-
ferences between the two groups. In particular,
perhaps the result could be caused by a differ-
ence in how well the two groups of participants
expected to perform. As it happens, participants
were asked: ‘How do you expect to score on an
intelligence test?’ before they did the test. The
answers to this question are summarised in Ta-
ble 3. This data suggests that participants in the
+-group initially had higher expectations. It is
difficult to get a consensus from the psychologi-
cal literature about how this might have affected
the results. On the one hand, some studies have
shown that positive expectations can have an ac-
celerating effect on a person’s actual positive emo-
tional experience (Wilson et al., 2003; Wilson and
Klaaren, 1992). Such results might suggest an al-
ternative explanation of the fact that the +-group
showed a greater change in positive emotions. On
the other hand, it might be argued that subjects
with lower expectations would be more surprised
(since both texts presented good results) and so
their emotions would have been influenced more
significantly. That is, if a subject already expects
to do well then one would not expect that find-
ing that they actually did well would cause much
of a change in their emotions. This would predict
that it should be the 0-group that shows the great-
est emotion change. Overall, it is hard to know
whether the data about expectations should affect
our confidence in the experiment result, though it
would be worthwhile controlling for initial expec-
tations in further experiments of this kind.
6 Discussion and Future Directions
6.1 Discussion
Compared with the previous study of van der Sluis
and Mellish (2008), we expected participants to
indicate stronger emotional effects, because the
text participants were asked to read was about their
own capabilities instead of about something in the
world around them which they could think would
not affect them. Indeed, this seems to have been
the case. In van der Sluis and Mellish (2008), all
responses used the lower half of the scale, whereas
with the slider our participants indicated values up
to both extremes of the range available. Unfortu-
nately, the fact that one set of values is discrete and
the other continuous means that it is hard to carry
out a simple statistical comparison.
6.2 Future Work
In the study described in the paper, a number of
different techniques (e.g. emphasis, vague adjec-
tives and adverbs) were used to phrase the various
propositions in the feedback. In future work we
aim to identify the relative importance of the indi-
vidual techniques.
6.3 Conclusion
The fact that we have been able to show a signifi-
cant difference in the emotions induced by the two
texts is very encouraging. It suggests that there
is a possible methodology for directly evaluating
affective NLG and that the tactical concerns with
which much of NLG research is occupied are rel-
evant to affective NLG. A similar methodology
could perhaps now be used to determine the ef-
fectiveness of specific NLG methods and mecha-
nisms in terms of inducing emotions. Although we
have now shown that NLG tactical decisions can
affect emotions, it remains to be seen what kind of
changes in strategy, learning, motivation, etc., can
be induced by positive affect and thus how these
framing decisions would best be made by an NLG
system.
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